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FOREWORD 
Technological developments and associated changes in the structure of economic 
activity have substantial consequences for the relative demands for the various factors of 
production. Changes in the composition of labor demand have particularly significant 
consequences, especially in market economies, in which relative earnings and conditions 
of employment may change substantially even over relatively brief periods. The first of 
the two papers in this report , which build upon the author 's earlier modeling of the mar-
kets for different educational-attainment classes of labor*, documents the anticipated 
decline in the relative earnings of the highly educated in the United States in the period 
since the late 1960s**. The second then summarizes the probable implications of these and 
related developments for the educational attainments of future cohorts of labor force 
entrants. 
It is anticipated that future studies will provide comparative analyses for other 
economies, illuminating the influence of institutional, demographic , and other factors on 
the process of labor force adaptation to changing patterns of labor demand . 
ANATOLISMYSHLYAEV 
Project Leader 
Comparative Analysis of Economic 
Structure and Growth 
*Stephen P. Dresch "Demography, Technology and Higher Education : Toward a Formal Model of 
Educational Adaptation", Journal of Political Economy (June 1975), and " Ability, Fertility and 
Educational Adaptation" , in Julian Simon (Ed.), Research in Population Economics (Greenwich, 
Connecticut : JAi Press, 1978). 
**These developments are examined at a much more refined level and in greater detail in Stephen P. 
Dresch, Occupational Earnings, 196 7- 1981: Returns to Occupational Choice, Schooling and Physician 
Specialization (Greenwich, Connecticut : JAI Press , 1981). 

Education and Lifetime Earnings: 
The Census Bureau's Misguided Misrepresentations 
Stephen P. Dresch 
Institute for Demographic and Economic Studies 
In the contemporary United States, education, 
conceived as an activity which is pursued in 
institutions of formal schooling, is perhaps the 
only "commodity" commonly perceived to be 
an effectively unlimited good. While the effec-
tiveness of schools and the effectiveness of 
increased spending on schools as a device by 
which to improve schooling may occasionally 
be questioned, the untapped potential contri-
bution of schooling to the nation constitutes a 
virtual article of faith . 
When, in the late 1950s, the natjon felt itself 
threatened by Soviet achievements in sci-
ence and technology, education was pro-
claimed as critical to the reestablishment of 
U.S. superiority. 
When, in the mid-l 960s, the nation commit-
ted itself to a war on poverty, schools 
occupied a central position in long-term 
strategy and in short-term tactics. 
When, in the 1970s, the nation entered a pro-
longed period of economic stagnation and 
deteriorating productivity, a lack of concern 
for the quality and vitality of schooling was 
identified as a significant contributor, sug-
gesting, by implication, that a renewed pub-
lic-policy commitment to education would 
restore economic growth. 
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When, finally, in the early 1980s, concern for 
lagging technology was reinforced by 
severe economic recession (overlaid on 
prior secular stagnation) and the discovery 
that military capabilities were again ostensi-
bly deteriorating, once again education was 
proclaimed as the source of renewed eco-
nomic health and secure defense. 
Education, in short, has become the universal 
nostrum, good for whatever ails society, 
regardless of how quickly or frequently the 
nature of the perceived social malaise may 
change. 
Undergirding this proeducationalist stance 
is the common perception that schooling, and 
especially higher schooling, is indeed a profit-
able investment for the individual. While this 
perception has had substantial justification at 
various points in the past, the U.S. Bureau of 
the Census has just published more recent 
data which , it contends, provides evidence of 
the continuing profitability of schooling invest-
ments. 
Notwithstanding the prominance provided 
by the popular press to the latest Census 
Bureau report (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
1983a) emphasizing the earnings "gains" 
associated with higher levels of schooling, that 
report, in comparison to a previous Census 
report (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1974), 
provides graphic evidence of the decline in the 
economic rewards associated with college and 
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postcollege schooling which has occured over 
the past decade. 
Consider the estimates of the present value 
of expected lifetime income for full-year, full-
time male workers (with income denominated 
in thousands of constant 1972 dollars) , con-
trolling for educational attainment, presented 
in Table 1 for the years 1968, 1970, 1972, and 
1979. 1 As emphasized in the Census report 
and in the press accounts, real incomes of 
those with college-level schooling did exceed 
those of high school graduates in 1979. How-
ever, these income estimates are not adjusted 
for the out-of-pocket costs of schooling and fail 
to take into account selectivity biases, i.e., the 
fact that selection, and self-selection, of college 
students results, generally, in the more able 
attending college, when the more able would 
have higher levels of income even at lower 
levels of schooling. 
More importantly, perhaps, an exclusive 
focus on estimates for 1979 obscures the fact 
that, over the period 1972-1979, expected 
lifetime incomes of the college educated 
declined dramatically, while those of high 
school graduates remained virtually constant 
(declining by less 1.2%). For the college edu-
cated the percentage declines, 1972-1979, 
were 11.2% for those with 16 years of school 
(college graduates) and 25.4% for those with 
17 + years of school (graduate and profes-
sional education).2 While selectivity biases 
may account for a small part of the 
1972-1979 declines for the more highly edu-
cated, in that higher proportions of the popula-
tion had higher levels of schooling in 1979 
than in 1972 (which, assuming a stable aggre-
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gate ability distribution, implies that levels of 
ability declined at all levels of schooling) , the 
bulk of the decline undoubtedly reflects real 
declines for comparable workers over this 7-
year period. 3 
As a result of these changes in lifetime 
incomes, the income gain associated with col-
lege-level schooling, by comparison to high 
school graduation, declined by about 40% for 
college graduates (for whom the ratio of col-
lege to high school lifetime income declined 
from 1.4 to 1.25) and by about 55% for per-
sons with graduate and professional training 
(for whom the ratio of college to high school 
lifetime income declined from 1.81 to 1.37).4 
That these declines in relative lifetime 
income are accounted for primarily by declines 
in the incomes of younger college-educated 
workers is indicated quite graphically by Table 
2, which presents income by year of age and 
educational attainment for full-time full-year 
attainment. 5 Thus, for college graduates in-
comes rose between 1972 and 1979 only for 
persons age 50 and over. In the case of those 
with graduate and professional training 
income rose at age 40 and above, but declines 
at younger ages were extremely sharp, with, 
e.g., a drop of approximately one-third below 
the age of 30. 
The failure to recognize (or, more likely, to 
admit publically) that gross earnings differen-
tials for average workers provide little evidence 
concerning the returns to schooling of margin 
workers (the last to elect a higher level of 
schooling) led to a fraudulent campaign, 
orchestrated by the U.S. Office of Education, 
to induce marginal young people to enter col-
Table 1. Present Value of Lifetime Income by Educational Attainment, 1968-1979. Male 
Full-Time Full-Year Workers (Thousands of Constant 1972 Dollars) 
Years of school 12 16 17 + Ratio to 12 Years 
Year 16 17+ 
1968 $219 $322 $344 1.470 1.571 
1970 226 316 378 1.398 1.673 
1972 237 331 429 1.397 1.810 
1979 234 293 320 1.253 1.365 
Note: For derivation, see text. 
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Table 2. Income by Age And Educational Attainment, 1972 and 1979. Male Full-Time Full-
Year Workers (Constant 1972 Dollars) 
Year 1972 1979 
Years of school 12 16 17+ 12 16 17+ 
Age 
25 $ 8,525 $10,489 $16,522 $ 9,190 $ 9,761 $10,710 
30 10,044 13,666 17,190 10,022 12.121 12,876 
35 11,227 16,210 17,987 12,781 15,290 17,917 
40 12,074 18,122 18,913 12,606 16,345 19,083 
45 12,585 19,402 19,968 13,215 18,301 22,001 
50 12,760 20,050 21,152 12,957 20,638 21,279 
55 12,599 20,066 22,464 12,871 21,056 25,173 
60 12,102 19,449 23,906 13,385 22,096 25,319 
Note: For derivation, see text. 
lege in the 1960s, with subway posters and 
television commercials proclaiming that "you" 
would sacrifice $100,000 in lifetime earnings if 
"you" didn' t attend college. In light of subse-
quent developments, the currently developing 
campaign, apparently spearheaded, surpris-
ingly, by the Bureau of the Census, is even 
more fraudulent and flagrantly dishonest. 
The one positive aspect of the decline in 
earnings of the more highly educated is that 
the degree of discrimination against duller chil-
dren, especially against the duller children of 
poor parents by comparison to their brighter 
peers, implicit in higher education subsidy pol-
icies has been significantly reduced. When the 
student leaves his subsidized schooling and 
experiences earnings no higher, over his life-
time, than his nonstudent peer, at least society 
has not taken from the latter to give to the 
former. Of course, the improvement in equity 
is purchased at the price of efficiency loss, i.e., 
society has taken from both and transfered the 
proceeds to educators, getting nothing in 
return, sacrificing whatever the educators (and 
marginal students) might have produced had 
they not been unproductively devoting them-
selves to putative education. In short, there are 
more efficient ways to improve equity than to 
subsidize schooling to the point that even the 
schooled fail to benefit. 
When, it can be anticipated, a significant 
fraction even of the beneficiaries of current 
programs would consider themselves abso-
lutely better off if given these benefits in a 
fungible form, not constrained to education, 
the burden of proof that these programs 
enhance social equity and efficiency falls with 
particular weight on those who advocate a 
continuation of existing policies. 
Clearly, higher education itself and those 
other activities (most notably, scientific 
research and scholarship) with which it is relat-
ed are of great (although often not well under-
stood) social value and importance. However, 
the health, vitality, and effectiveness of higher 
education ultimately will not benefit and in fact 
will be compromised by the misguided pursuit 
of misrepresented objectives. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The estimates of lifetime income presented 
in Table 1 are derived from the U.S. 
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Bureau of the Census (1974; 1983a). In all 
cases the estimates are for male full-time 
full-year workers, expressed as a present 
value at age 18, discounting at 3% and 
assuming a zero rate of "productivity 
growth" (i.e., no secular increase in real 
earnings by age and educational attain-
ment) . In the case of the 1979 estimates the 
published report presented the present val-
ue of 1979 lifetime earnings expressed in 
1981 dollars, inflating by the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI). To convert these esti-
mates to constant 1972 dollars they were 
first deflated to 1979 using the CPI, and 
these 1979 estimates were then deflated to 
1972 using the Personal Consumption 
Expenditure (PCE) deflator from the 
National Income and Product Accounts. 
Finally, to obtain consistency between the 
1972 and earlier reports of lifetime income, 
on the one hand, and the 1979 report of 
lifetime earnings, on the other, the latter 
was scaled by the 1981 income/earnings 
ratio of 35-44-year-old full-time full-year 
male workers, controlling for educational 
attainment (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
l983b) . It should be noted that compara-
ble data for full-time full-year workers are 
unavailable prior to 1967. However, rela-
tive constancy is suggested by estimates for 
all persons with income over the period 
1956 to 1968. 
2. For persons with 13-15 years of school 
(some college), the estimated present value 
of lifetime income declined by about 5% 
between 1972 and 1979. 
3. The estimated declines in lifetime incomes 
of the more highly educated are consistent 
with the findings of a detailed analysis of 
lifetime earnings by occupation (Dresch, 
forthcoming) . That study found that, 
between 1972 and 1977, lifetime earnings 
had increased modestly for non-pro-
fessional -technical-managerial (nonPTM) 
occupations but had declined for all PTM 
occupations other than physicians, other 
health professionals and noncollege teach-
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ers (although the increase · for the latter 
occupation was of trivial magnitude). 
4. For persons with some college but less than 
graduation, the ratio of college to high 
school lifetime earnings declined from 
about 1.15 ir. the 1960s and early 1970s to 
about 1.08 in 1979. 
5. In contrast to Table 1, which discounted 
lifetime earnings from 1979 to 1972 using 
the Personal Consumption Expenditure 
Deflator, Table 2 was obtained utilizing the 
Consumer Price Index. As in Table 1 the 
1979 estimates were converted from earn-
ings to income, in this case utilizing 1981 
income-earnings ratios for 10-year age 
groups (25-34, 35-44, etc.), controlling 
for educational attainment. 
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College Enrollment 
STEPHEN P. DRESCH 
Priar to the 1970s, growth had constituted the norm for American 
higher education. Between 1880 and 1960, the college-age population (con-
sisting of persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four) increased at an 
average annual rate of 1 percent, doubling in sixty-nine years; during the same 
period, however, college enrollment (undergraduate, graduate, and profes-
sional) grew at an annual rate of 4.4 percent, doubling on the average every six-
teen years. 
Many would object that a significant and growing proportion of college en-
rollment is accounted for by persons above the traditional college age, and 
hence that an exclusive focus on eighteen- to twenty-four-year-old students pur-
posefully excludes an important development. However, enrollment of persons 
above the traditional college age has been substantially less important, quanti-
tatively, than often alleged (especially for institutions in the academic core of 
the higher-education system) and will probably become even less important 
over the next several decades. 
Obviously, there are severe limits on the degree to which the growth of col-
lege enrollment can proceed at a disproportionate rate relative to that of the to-
tal college-age population. Although continuous relative growth is impossible, 
the limits to growth were being rapidly approached by 1960, followed in the 
next decade by an acceleration of the process. The growth rate of the college-age 
population increased to 4.2 percent, and the rate of enrollment growth surged to 
more than 8.0 percent. 
This pattern began to change during the 1970s. The growth of the enrollment 
rate declined from 4.0 to 1.7 percent, while the growth of the college-age popu-
lation declined from 4.2 to 1.8 percent. As a result, the rate of growth of enroll-
ment contracted from more than 8.0 percent to 3.5 percent. 
The experience of the 1970s suggests that exponential growth was replaced by 
logistic growth, exhibiting a slow decay in the growth rate as enrollment asymp-
totically approaches an upper limit. Neither exponential nor logistic growth, 
unfortunately, is adequate as a basis for understanding the determinants of en-
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rollment in higher education. The fundamental flaw in both explanations is the 
implicit perception of an autonomous process. Even casual observation is suffi-
cient to indicate that the growth of enrollment is organically related to broader 
social and economic as well as demographic developments. 
Increases in the enrolled proportion of the college-age population have made 
a greater contribution to the growth of enrollment than have previous increases 
in the general population. Several of the more important factors influencing the 
college enrollment behavior of young adults that will be examined in this essay 
are: (1) changes in the academic competence of young adults; (2) systematic 
shifts in parental and family characteristics; (3) public-policy developments that 
influence enrollment behavior; and (4) changes in the anticipated long-run returns 
to investments in human capital of the type represented by a college education . 
Because developments in each of these dimensions are likely to be adverse, 
declines in enrollment rates can be expected. Thus a forecast of enrollment rates 
and levels through the end of the century indicates that declining enrollment 
rates will magnify the effects for college enrollment of a contracting young-adult 
population . 
After increasing from 16 million in 1960 to 30 million in 1980, the college-age 
population will fall to less than 24 million in the mid-l 990s, declining by about 
20 percent over fifteen years (at an average annual rate of 1.5 percent) . A 25 per-
cent decline in the population of eighteen-year-old persons (from 4 .3 to 3.3 
million), the primary source of freshman college entrants, will occur between 
1980 and 1995. The margins of error associated with these forecasts, it should be 
noted, are quite small, since all of these persons have already been born and the 
size of this cohort will not be significantly affected by changes in rates of mor-
tality and international migration. 
After 1995 a modest growth of the college-age population can again be an-
ticipated, with the eighteen-year-old cohort approaching 3.8 million in 2000, 
while the eighteen- to twenty-four-year-old group will increase to about 25 
million. Beyond 2000, for obvious reasons, population projections become 
speculative. 
Academic Competence 
Perhaps the most consistent finding of studies of enrollment behavior concerns 
the influence of measured academic competence (ability-cum-achievement) on 
the probability of college enrollment and completion. To the degree to which 
academic competence is innately determined, the relationship between ability 
and college enrollment constitutes a severe constraint on rising college-level 
educational attainments, simply because these capabilities are not uniformly 
distributed within the college-age population. 
Declining academic competence may be due, in part , to differential rates of 
fertility decline. For example, academic achievement has generally been found 
to be closely associated with the educational attainments of parents. Relative 
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declines in fertility have been greater for the more highly educated. Thus, by 
1981 the average thirty- to thirty-four-year-old college-educated woman had 
had only 1 .2 children while women who were high school graduates had had 
two children, and women who were not high school graduates had had 2.7 chil-
dren . Similarly, thirty- to thirty-four-year-old wives of college-educated 
husbands had had 1.6 children, while those with husbands who were high 
school graduates had had 2.1 children, and those with husbands who did not 
finish high school had had 2.6 children. 
The conventional view of academic competence as a product of familial and 
school inputs, however, warrants a high degree of skepticism in its application 
to the interpretation of changing college enrollment rates. The usual statistical 
models represent academic competence as the passive consequence of prede-
termined factors, such as genetic endowment, parental and family character-
istics , and schooling. A more inclusive model would recognize academic com-
petence as consciously determined by individuals - children as well as parents 
and teachers - in response to perceived costs and benefits of alternative uses of 
resources. Thus, cross-sectional evidence suggests that the relative returns to 
college-level schooling enter significantly into the determination of high school 
aptitude and achievement and therefore that measured academic competence 
and college attendance are simultaneously determined . If this is the case, then 
the conventional finding that measured academic competence is statistically 
more significant and quantitatively more potent than any other variables ex-
plaining college-level educational attainment may be circular, since both are 
jointly determined by the perceived advantages of education and other factors, 
such as parental education . 
Recognition of the endogenous nature of academic competence and its joint 
determination with college entry does not negate the adverse effects that may be 
attributable to such factors as family instability and declining teacher quality. 
However, it does suggest that the decline observed since the early 1960s may 
have been partly due to conscious decisions attributable to worsening job pros-
pects for highly educated labor . 
Parental and Family Characteristics 
Factors such as parental education, which have conventionally been found to 
influence academic competence, have also been found to influence directly the 
probability of college entry and completion . Again, the failure to recognize the 
joint determination of measured academic competence and educational attain-
ment may lead to significant biases in the estimated effects of various factors. 
However, for the same reason that the bias in the effect of academic competence 
is likely to be positive, the biases in the estimated effects of such factors as 
parental education are likely to be negative . Because a significant fraction of the 
effect of a variable such as parental education is likely to be captured by mea-
sured academic aptitude-cum-achievement, the true effect of parental education 
is probably greater than commonly found. 
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In this context , parental education appears to be an important variable, in 
that rising levels of educational attainment may be self-reinforcing. Higher 
parental education generally implies higher levels of academic competence and 
higher rates of college attendance on the part of children, implying levels of aca-
demic competence and rates of college attendance of grandchildren that are 
higher yet. This self-reinforcing process may be significantly attenuated, how-
ever, by the relationship between educational attainment and fertility, with fertil-
ity rates of the more highly educated quite low relative to those of the less edu-
cated . The net effect of rising educational attainments of the parental generation 
may be much less positive than one might have expected. 
Family income also affects the probability of college attendance. However, 
over the last decade median family income, controlling for the age of the family 
head, has been virtually stagnant, after almost doubling between 1950 and 
1970 . Controlling for both age and educational attainment of the family head, 
family income declined absolutely over the decade of the 1970s for the more 
highly educated . Thus, declines in income have at least partially canceled the ef-
fects of rising parental educational attainment for the college-enrollment prob-
abilities of children . While cyclical recovery may lead to modest increases in 
median income, the growth of the 1950-70 period is unlikely to recur over the 
next two decades . However, if fertility rates remain low, income per child may 
nonetheless rise, partially compensating for the decline in the size of the college-
age cohort. 
Deciding when to have children may have significant influences on college-
enrollment behavior. The "sibling squeeze" (the rising proportion of children 
from families with two or more children of college age at the same time), reflect-
ing the high fertility rates in the 1950s and 1960s, is frequently offered as an ex-
planation for the decline in college-attendence rates - of men but not of 
women -observed over the past fifteen years . Just as the sibling squeeze tight-
ened as a result of high fertility , it will relax as a result of fertility declines, with 
ostensibly favorable consequences for enrollment rates. However, given the 
capacity to redistribute financial resources over time, the important change has 
involved the rise and subsequent decline in the number of children in a family 
rather than the timing of birth per se . In short, the interval between births is ir-
relevant to the issue of the family's desire or capacity to finance the education of 
its children . 
Public Policy 
From the late 1950s through the late 1970s, changes in federal policy favored 
college attendance. It can be conservatively estimated that by 1980 more than 
one-half of all undergraduate students were receiving some form of recognized 
federal financial assistance, and a saturation point was being rapidly ap-
proached . The costs of this federal assistance were increasing explosively, espe-
cially as the cumulative impact on the federal budget of prior subsidized lending 
became apparent. 
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Despite the pervasiveness of federal aid, its impact on college attendance rates 
is open to some question . For example, W . Lee Hansen has argued that there is 
no evidence that enrollment rates of low-income high school graduates were sig-
nificantly affected by the introduction of direct federal grants in the early 
1970s. 1 While this conclusion can be challenged on the grounds that enrollment 
rates would have declined significantly in the absence of increases in federal stu-
dent assistance, it is true that, whatever the impact of federal student assistance 
on enrollment rates in the past, further increases in enrollment rates can be in-
duced only by further increases in the level and coverage of federal student 
assistance . However, since 1981 the tendency has been to reduce the level of 
support and to contract coverage. Thus, eligibility for federally guaranteed 
loans has been made contingent on the "need" of students from higher-income 
families, while social-security educational benefits are being phased out. In 
short, during the 1980s, federal higher-education policy cannot be expected to 
induce increases in enrollment rates but may be responsible for significant 
declines . 
Economic policies aside, federal actions beyond the explicit domain of educa-
tional policy also have significant consequences for enrollment rates. For exam-
ple, near the end of the Vietnam War, the military draft probably did exert a 
positive influence on college enrollment rates of young men. Less obvious but 
possibly more significant influences were exerted by high and rising rates of in-
come taxation (which served both to reduce the relative risks of human capital 
investment and to raise expected returns to human relative to physical capital 
investment). In effect, an income tax reduces the relative variance in the returns 
to more risky investments. Moreover, because income that is not overtly 
"earned" is not subject to tax, investments in human capital that take the form of 
forgone earnings, constituting perhaps two-thirds of the total cost of an invest-
ment in a college education, are accorded instantaneous depreciation for tax 
purposes, while other investments can be depreciated only over longer periods . 
Comparable consequences flow from relatively rapid increases in the 
minimum wage, which reduced both the employment opportunities for high 
school graduates and the forgone earnings associated with college attendance as 
well as the training opportunities provided by employers as alternatives to for-
mal schooling. As in the case of educational policy, it is unlikely that future 
developments in the policies concerning taxes and the minimum wage will help 
increase enrollment rates. Actual developments are likely to be unfavorable, es-
pecially if there is any significant move toward indirect taxation (e.g ., a value 
added tax) or toward a lower minimum wage for minors . 
While short-term, cyclical economic developments cannot be attributed solely 
to federal monetary, fiscal, and related policies, these policies do significantly 
affect the economy, even if the effects are often unintended . These short-term 
economic impacts cause public policy to exert its most pervasive influence on 
college-enrollment behavior. The critical variable is the unemployment rate, a 
primary determinant of the sacrifice in earnings entailed by school attendance, 
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quantitatively the most important component of the costs of schooling. From a 
level of 3.5 to 4.0 percent in the late 1960s, the aggregate unemployment rate 
moved erratically upward, rising to 5. 9 percent in 1971, declining to 4. 9 percent 
in 1973, rising again to 8.5 percent in 1975, declining to 5.8 percent in 1979, and 
finally rising to almost 11 percent in late 1982 and early 1983. Moreover, unem-
ployment rates for persons of college age have consistently averaged about 
twice the overall unemployment rate. 
The increase in the unemployment rate from 5.6 percent in 1974 to 8.5 percent 
in 1975 probably contributed significantly to the unanticipated 10 percent in-
crease in college enrollment in 1975. However; although the unemployment rate 
remained high in 1976, at 7.7 percent, enrollment actually declined by 1.0 per-
cent. In short, sustained increases in unemployment rates appear to contribute 
to increases in enrollment rates. With the slow declines in unemployment rates 
in the mid-1980s, it is implausible to expect that unemployment will provide a 
stimulus to enrollment over this period. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, state policies were much more passive but no less fa-
vorable. Enrollment in public colleges and universities rose more than fourfold 
between 1960 and 1980, while levels of tuition and fees (in dollars of constant 
purchasing power) remained roughly constant. State appropriations for institu-
tions increased from less than $3 billion in 1965 to more than $20 billion in 1980, 
for an increase in real terms of about 200 percent. However, it is unlikely that 
state policy will become more favorable, and state fiscal exigencies may well 
result in relative declines in support for higher education, especially in the in-
dustrial states in the Northeast. As a result, the levels of tuition and fees in 
public institutions may well increase significantly, and restrictions may be 
placed on enrollment in the segments of public systems of higher education that 
are in high demand. 
Dresch and Waldenberg estimated the effects of prospective changes in state 
and federal policies on effective tuition rates for the period 1982 to 1988. Ac-
cording to their projections of tuition less institutionally awarded and direct 
federal grants, public tuition is expected to increase from $600 to $1,200 (1982 
dollars) in four-year institutions and net private four-year college tuition from 
$2,700 to $3,000 for the period FY 1982 to FY 1988. 2 While these effective net 
tuition projections can be viewed only as suggestive of prospective 
developments, it is clear that state and federal policies may result in substantial 
increases in student costs, severely affecting the level (and distribution) of 
enrollment. 
A stylized overview of the net effects of current public policies on the costs 
and financing of a representative year of higher education is shown in table 1. 
More than half of the $8,500 in government subsidies is rarely recognized be-
cause it consists of unemployment scholarships (the reduction in forgone earn-
ings due to unemployment), tax expenditures or subsidies, and loan subsidies. 
Future policy developments are likely to have marginally and possibly se-
verely adverse effects on enrollments. The "invisible" contributions of the gov-
114 I STEPHEN P. DRESCH 
TABLE 1 
Stylized Overview of the Financing of a Year of Higher Education 
Source 
Government subsidies 
State 
Institutional subsidy 
Federal 
Unemployment scholarship 
Overt grant 
Grant implicit in loan 
Tax expenditure (subsidy) 
Total federal 
Total government 
Studentlfamily·borne costs 
True loan 
Work 
Private transfer 
Reduced consumption/savings 
Total student/family·borne costs 
Total costs 
Amount 
$ 3,000 
2,500 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
$ 5,500 
$ 8,500 
$ 1,000 
2,000 
1,500 
2,000 
6,500 
$15,000 
ernment in financing higher education - notably unemployment scholarships, 
tax subsidies, and loan subsidies - are likely to decline most precipitously. Thus 
the overall impact of public policy will be to reduce the enrollment rates of the 
college-age population . 
The Labor Market and Long-term Returns to Human Capital 
Economic factors constitute perhaps the most pervasive influences on the col-
lege-attendance behavior of young adults. Abstracting from short-run, cyclical 
economic developments, the long-term economic rewards for college comple-
tion can be viewed as a function of relative demands for different educational 
classes of labor and the educational composition of the labor supply . Between 
the late 1920s and the late 1960s, shifts in the structure of labor demand and of 
labor supply were mutually accommodating, producing virtual stability in the 
earnings of more relative to less highly educated labor. Since 1970, however, the 
economic rewards associated with a college education have declined radically , 
reflecting the explosive increase in the relative representation of college 
graduates in the labor market at a time of comparative stability in the structure 
of labor demand. 
The college-educated proportion of the population between the ages of 
twenty-five and sixty-four increased from 9.1 percent in 1960 to 12.1 percent in 
1970 and further to 18.2 percent in 1979. The impact this rapid post-1970 in-
crease in educational attainments has had on the lifetime incomes of college 
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TABLE 2 
Present Value of Lifetime Income by Educational Attainment, 1968-79 
Male Fu/I-time, Fu/I-year Workers 
(thousands of constant 1972 dollars) 
Years of Schooling Ratio to 12 Years 
Year 12 16 17+ 16 17+ 
1968 $219 $322 $344 1.470 1.571 
1970 226 316 378 1.398 1.673 
1972 237 331 429 1.397 1.810 
1979 234 293 320 1.253 1.365 
SOURCE: Derived from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1974, 1983a). 
NOTE: Estimates are expressed as a present value at age eighteen, discounting at 3 percent and 
assuming a zero rate of "productivity growth" (i.e., no secular increase in real earnings by age and 
educational attainment). 
graduates compared with high school graduates is indicated in table 2. While the 
estimated cross-sectional lifetime real earnings of high school graduates declined 
by 1.2 percent between 1972 and 1979, the real earnings of college graduates de-
clined 11 .2 percent, while those with graduate or professional training declined 
2S.4 percent. Over this seven-year period the relative real earnings gain asso-
ciated with a college education, compared with a high school education, de-
clined by about 40 percent , and by about SS percent for persons with graduate 
and professional training . These declines in relative lifetime real income are ac-
counted for primarily by declines in the incomes of younger college-educated 
workers . Between 1972 and 1979, incomes rose only for college graduates age 
fifty and over and for persons with graduate and professional training age forty 
and over . For the most highly educated, declines at younger ages were ex-
tremely sharp, with , for example, a drop of approximately one-third for those 
below the age of thirty . 
Partly because of these sharp declines in the relative earnings of younger 
college-educated workers, the proportions of eighteen- and nineteen-year-old 
men enrolled in college declined from 39.1 percent in 1969 to 31 .3 percent in 
1979. For twenty- and twenty-one-year-old men and for twenty-two- to twenty-
four-year-old men, the declines in enrollment over this period were from 32.3 to 
27.8 percent and from 18.2 to 16.3 percent , respectively . 
As indicated previously, the contracting market for highly educated labor 
may well explain not only declining enrollment rates but also the decline in 
measured academic capabilities. A cross-sectional analysis of the determinants 
of standardized test scores of 1971-72 high school seniors and of 1972-73 high 
school juniors relying on interregional variations in the lifetime earnings of col-
lege relative to high school graduates, found the elasticity of test scores with 
respect to the ratio of college to high school graduates' lifetime earnings to be 
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approximately 0.5 for men and approximately 1.0 for women. In essence, if the 
rewards for going to college were relatively low in the region, this was reflected 
in a lesser investment in the development of academic skills and competencies in 
high school. 
Whether or not cross-sectional findings are applicable in determining the geo-
graphic covariation in relative earnings and test scores to the explanation of 
temporal changes in these variables, it is interesting to note that the declines in 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores observed over the same period are consis-
tent with the declines in the relative lifetime earnings of college graduates. Thus 
a decline of about 10 percent in relative lifetime earnings from 1970 to 1980 
would imply a 5 percent decline in test scores of men and a 10 percent decline in 
test scores of women. Actual declines in composite SAT scores over this period 
were 5.1 percent for men and 7.2 percent for women-declines that are re-
markably consistent with predictions based on the estimated cross-sectional 
relationships. 
Evidence supports the contention that changes in the relative labor-market 
conditions confronting the highly educated have significant implications for the 
educational behavior of young adults. This is not a case of unidirectional 
causality; changes in educational behavior (e.g., college entry and completion 
rates) induced by labor-market developments, will significantly alter the rela-
tive supplies of different educational classes of workers and thus contribute to 
the future state of the highly educated labor market. The effects that the rela-
tionship between the labor market and educational behavior will have on the fu-
ture college enrollment for two representative classes will be examined in the 
next section. 
Forecasting Interrelated Enrollment and Labor Market Developments 
The most important impact on future college enrollment may come from the 
changing relative earnings of college-educated persons . Two models of the rela-
tionships between (a) college-completion rates of young adults, (b) the educa-
tional composition of the adult population, and (c) the relative earnings of the 
college educated attempt to capture the broad outlines of secular changes and 
abstract entirely from short-term cyclical developments, although they ignore 
such potentially important factors as changes in relative levels of college tuition 
and in student financial assistance, not to mention changes in parental and family 
characteristics that may have a significant influence on educational attainments. 
The focus of the educational-adaptations model underlying the forecasts is 
the educational composition (college / noncollege) of the active adult population 
(AAP) between the ages of twenty-five and sixty-four. That composition deter-
mines the earnings of college graduates relative to those of nongraduates, which 
in turn determine the college-educated proportions of twenty-four-year-old en-
trants into the AAP. In the demography-technology (OT) model , relative earn-
ings directly determine the educational attainments of labor-force entrants. 
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The model was calibrated so as to conform with the simulated college 
educated share of the AAP to actual observations over the period 1960 to 1972. 
Estimates of the actual educational composition were available for eleven years 
of the thirteen-year calibration period. The mean error was 0.18 percentage 
points over the full calibration period. The forecast values for the period 1973 to 
1979 are, on average, 0.36 percentage points less than the actual values . 
However, the discrepancies decline significantly after 1977. Thus the confor-
mance of the simulated and actual educated shares of the AAP is reasonably 
good for both the calibration and forecast periods . 
The model does not provide a forecast of college and university enrollment. 
Instead, it predicts the college-educated proportion of the twenty-four year-old 
group, which constitutes the subsequent year's pool of entrants into the AAP. 
Thus the model assumes that educational attainments are determined before the 
age of twenty-five and are unalterable thereafter - a highly stylized 
characterization of the process. Obviously, persons over the age of twenty-four 
do receive college degrees . However, if this stylization is reasonably predictive, 
as it appears to be with reference to the educational composition of the twenty-
five- to sixty-four-year-old population, then the divergence of the model from 
reality may be of little consequence. 
For the entire period 1961 to 1981 the OT index of the twenty-four year old 
college graduates exhibits substantially more rapid growth than any of the vari-
ous enrollment indices. The model does, however, correctly anticipate the sub-
stantial decline in growth rates after 1970 and the enrollment plateau that oc-
curred at the end of the decade. 
The initial version of the model, developed in and underlying the forecasts of 
OT, assumed a homogeneous twenty-four-year-old cohort, ignoring the conse-
quences of unequal distribution of ability as discouraging to educational at-
tainments, even in response to labor-market demands for the highly educated. 
A more refined version of the model - ability-fertility (AF) - recognized the 
declining average and marginal ability as larger proportions of the cohort com-
pleted college. 
For the period 1960 to 1972 (the calibration period) the AF forecast of the col-
lege-educated proportion of the twenty-five- to sixty-four-year-old population 
tracks the actual proportion as well as the OT forecast. After 1972, however, 
the AF forecast falls progressively further below the actually reported propor-
tion. If the data are not contaminated by systematically biased misreporting of 
educational attainments or changes in the educational participation patterns, 
which result in increasing proportions of nongraduates reporting sixteen or 
more years of school, then it would appear that the AF forecast is inferior to the 
less-sophisticated OT forecast. The two models predict enrollment declines of 4S 
to SS percent and 2S to 30 percent respectively. 
Both forecasts oversimplify reality. Neither recognizes the quite different re-
cent trends in college entry and completion rates of men and women. Moreover, 
there is no unambiguous means of determining which is more accurate. In addi-
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tion to forecasting enrollment declines of 30 to 50 percent, the models predict a 
decline of between 5 and 7 percent in the cross-sectional present value of lifetime 
earnings of college graduates relative to high school graduates over the period 
1961 to 1977. As table 2 indicates, this predicted decline is roughly consistent 
with the approximate 10 percent decline in the present value of college relative 
to high school graduates' lifetime income observed between 1972 and 1979. 
The models predict further declines in the relative earnings of college grad-
uates between 1977 and 1990. Thus the economic status of young college grad-
uates can be expected to continue to deteriorate. As a result, the children of up-
wardly mobile middle-class parents will find their material aspirations and 
expectations increasingly frustrated, even to the point that many children of the 
1960s cohort of young adults will earn less real income than their parents. This 
development could have major social and political consequences. 
Conclusion 
The path of college enrollment through at least the mid-1990s will change 
radically . As the declining growth of the 1970s clearly indicates, institutional 
structures and patterns of organizational and individual behavior adapted to 
continuous growth are likely to change. While the inevitability of the prospec-
tive contraction may be questioned, a careful review of likely developments in a 
number of important dimensions-such as the labor market, public policy, and 
the family-leads to the conclusion that a significant, probably severe, contrac-
tion will occur. This contraction will end before the turn of the century . How-
ever, many of the influences that caused the -contraction will endure. Whether 
those influences will hinder the effectiveness of the higher-education system re-
mains to be seen. Changes occurring in the 1980s will certainly be as dramatic as 
any in the past. Whether these changes enhance or weaken the future vitality of 
academe is still an open question. 
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